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Taking Stalk of Peace Initiatives and Agreements by Cross-border Communities, since the Lokirima Peace Accord of 1973:

Achievements and Challenges for Peace,
Security and Development among the
'Ateker' communities and their
neighbours across the International
Boundaries.



By
Hon. Pulkol David Bwangamoe

Presenter: Hon. David Pulkol is a Graduate of Makerere University and the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. Former Member of Parliament (MP) for Matheniko constituency in Karamoja, former Cabinet Minister in different ministerial portfolios and two times, Former Director General for External Security (ESO), in the Government of Uganda, former Deputy Regional Director for UNICEF in East and Southern Africa-Regional Office-Nairobi Kenya. Mr. Pulkol is a multi-skilled professional and a polyvalent thinker with a career spanning many years of public life-covering areas of academia-University teaching, and applied research, public policy, legislation, social development and human security. Hon. Pulkol has also been involved in several cross-border peace and development initiatives. Continues to serve in several NGO boards including as; Chairman of Advisory Board for Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU). Mr. Pulkol is currently a Principal Advisor at Operations Wealth Creation (OWC), Office of the President Government of Uganda, and Member of the Executive Committee of the Africa Security Sector Network (ASSN)-Ghana and Executive Director of Africa Leadership Institute (ALI).

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1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE INVENTORY OF PEACE INITIATIVES AND AGREEMENTS BY CROSS-BORDER ‘ATEKER’ COMMUNITIES, WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS SINCE 1973

This paper is a discourse of cross-border peace initiatives and agreements that have since the Lokirama Peace Accord in 1973, been entered into (either verbally or in writing) by armed pastoral communities of the Karamoja cluster of the ‘*Ateker*’ descent and their neighbours, straddling across the Kenya–Uganda; the Southern Sudan -Uganda ; Kenya -Southern Sudan; and the Ethiopia -Kenya international borders.

This analytical presentation, catalogue insights gleaned from an inventory of the peace agreements entered into by cross-border communities, since 1973-2008 as documented by the Africa Leadership Institute (ALI). It is expected to:

- i. Inform the Cross-border Senior Government Leaders Forum meeting held at Moroto, to review the trends, patterns, aspirations and challenges of Peace, Security and Development efforts undertaken since the Lokirama Peace accord of 1973.
- ii. Contribute to a better understanding on the several historical cross-border peace agreements that provide additional baseline information for evaluating the impact of the commitments of:
 - a. the Second Heads of State and Governments Summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC-GLR) held in Nairobi, Kenya on December 14th – 15th, 2006; where regional leaders agreed to undertake efforts to transform border zones into spaces for peace, *security and economic growth*;
 - b. the IGAD protocol on transhumance pastoralism
 - c. the EAC Member States specific actions, including the bilateral MoU’s, and their implementation mechanisms.
- iii. Provide insights and lessons learnt on the persistent failure among the ‘*Ateker*’ Cross-border communities, and identify strategic, and practical actions for peaceful co-existence and economic transformation like the success story of the Masai cross-border communities of Kenya and Tanzania.

The specific catalogue of ‘*cross-border peace agreements*’ here discussed, are part of the outcomes of peace initiatives supported by different donors and peace actors such as PACT-KENYA and PACT SUDAN in liaison with local authorities and CSOs. They also include peace initiatives by IGAD, and the Karamoja Cluster project supported by the UN University for Peace in collaboration with Africa Leadership Institute (AFLI) and Uganda Martyrs’ University (UMU), Nkozi.

These findings were shared with senior Government Ministers of foreign Affairs, Security and Internal Affairs, Members of Parliament, as well as Community and CSO leaders in the 2009 regional conference hosted in Kampala by the IC-GLR secretariat in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign affairs of Government of Uganda and Africa leadership institute (AFLI) with support from by European Union Instrument for Stability.



Madam Secretary General of the IC-GLR Secretariat, Senior Ministers, Head of EU Delegation in Uganda and Members of Parliament and Seniors officials from the governmnets of Uganda, Kenya South Sudan and Ethiopia.



Minister of State for Karamoja Affairs Hon. Aston Kajara and the Head of EU Delegation in Uganda at the IC-GLR Conference on Ateker Cross-border Initiative for peace, security and development.



The Iteso cultural troupe performing a skit at the IC-GLR Ateker Conference for peace, security and development



The Karamoja elders in a cultural performance at the IC-GLR Ateker Conference



The Karamoja women leaders at the IC-GLR - Ateker Conference for peace, security and development.


1.0.1 Introduction

The ‘*Ateker*’ people are the Itung’a speaking group of Plains Nilotes bound together by their history of origin, linguistic ties, culture and identity, traced to the Middle East and the Egyptian Nile valley civilization as well as Abyssinia in Ethiopia. They are said to have migrated southwards to their present areas of settlements in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Some oral traditions state that this group, during their migration occupied the land between the Blue Nile and White Nile of present-day Sudan [*Neni ekaria Ngulu awadete akare apa etuko-Karthoum*]. They practice economic activities characterised by nomadic and in some cases, agro-pastoralism as their main livelihood.

TRACING THE MIGRATION ROUTE OF ATEKER PEOPLE AND THEIR CULTURAL HERITAGE.

Unlike the Luo (Nilotics) speaking group of Nilotes who migrated southwards, along the White Nile from Bar-el-gazel to their present areas of settlements in Eastern part of Africa - South Sudan, Uganda and Kenya, the ‘*ATEKER*’ group of Itung’a speaking plains Nilotes migrated eastwards along the Blue Nile and to Ethiopian Highlands. They further descended southwards, along the eastern arm of the East African rift valley, to a land west of the present-day Lake Turukana (Rudolf).

Map 1:



The entire ATEKER people with a lot of their livestock, settled in the Elemi triangle. It is an area located to the west of Lake Turkana (Rudolf) covering the area between the two tri-points where the countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan meet on the one hand, and then where Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan meet.

Presently an area of contention among the governments of Ethiopia, South Sudan and Kenya- Elemi triangle is a place of great mineral wealth potential, abounding and teeming with wildlife. It is located closer to the Lotikipi area of huge underground water aquifer discoveries that can take the entire Kenya, 70 years to exhaust.

While at Elemi triangle, both the livestock and human population grew. Draught, famine, and disease brokeout and a debate arose on what ought to be done to secure a sustainable future. Spies also known as “*Ngika’rebok*” or “*Ngi’rototin*”, were sent in three directions to “*Are’bokin*”-i.e. to undertake a long range-resource tracking and intelligence survey, to ascertain where water and pastures are plentiful and the land was disease free. They were to locate a place that could sustain all the livestock and the human population. One group went west-wards to the present-day border crossing point of Nadapal (between Kenya and South Sudan). Another group went climbing the escarpment towards the South-west in to the present day Karamoja region of Uganda, while the last went more southwards following the eastern arm of the East African Rift valley.

As shown by Map 1 above, the last group that went South-wards is now what has come to be known as ***Southern Plains Nilotes***. They were motivated by an intelligence report of several lakes supported by a network of river tributaries, along the rift valley, thus making it an ideal place to occupy since it had a lake with salt-licks (Lake Magadi). This group consists of the Samburu and Maasai speaking-communities of peripheral ‘*ATEKER*’ people. They have retained 40 to 50% of the original Ateker language which constitutes the root words while the joining words are from the Nandi group of Kalenjin. Today, the Maasai are settled both in Kenya and Tanzania.


The second group called, ***Central Plains Nilotes*** are those that climbed the escarpment into the northern part of Mt. Moroto-Uganda they settled north of Apule river catchment (*Nakadanya and Mogos hills*) of present day Matheniko County and Lotisan sub-county. This group found the escarpment green with moderate temperatures modified by high altitude.

Then came, the third group referred to as *Northern Plains Nilotes* -who were motivated by intelligence reports of a big river to the far west which could sustain all their livestock and population. That river is present day White Nile, around Juba. This Baari speaking group of peripheral Ateker consists of *the Baari, Pojulu, Kuku, Nyangwara and the Kakwa in present day Central Equatoria, and the Kakwa in Yei river basin in South Sudan, Koboko in West Nile Uganda and in the DRC*. Also accompanying this group westwards were Lotukho people on Imatong Mountain ranges south-west of Torit and the Lango community in Sertenya on the South-Eastern slopes of the Imatong Mountains stretching to the tri-point east of the Madiopei border crossing separating the Acholi of Kitgum-Uganda, Chukdum county of South Sudan and Karenga District of Karamoja - Uganda.

Others in this group include the Lopit people who are now settled around Ngangala mountain valley and between Torit and Juba.

1.0.2. The Core Ateker Group

Map 2:



As shown on Map 2 above, there was another outbreak of both human and livestock diseases and draughts while settled at Apule areas of Lotithan and Nangolol Apolon in Karamoja, that caused famine and further dispersal of the *Central Plains Nilotes*.

The Jie moved westwards of Nangolol Apolon, to the present areas of Kotido district while the Dodoth moved northwards to their present areas of Kaabong and Karenga Districts. The Jiye and Toposa of South Sudan moved further northwards to their present locations neighbouring the Didinga to the south-west, Karimojong of Uganda in the south, and the Turkana of Kenya to the east. The Nyanga'tom continued and settled both in Southern Sudan border lands straddling in to South Omo valley areas of present-day Ethiopia where they now neighbour and have to a great extent, culturally influenced the Dassenach with whom they now inhabit the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS) of Ethiopia. The Nyaaanga'tom also border the Toposa and Jiye of South Sudan and Turkana of Kenya.

The rest of the Karimojong- Matheniko, Pian, and Bokora spread out to the south, south-east and south-westwards while the Iteso and the Lango of present-day Uganda, proceeded further on. Another group went East of Mt. Elgon and continuing South wards into what ATEKER oral traditions called *Akare-Apa- Engura*-meaning the well of an old man called "*Papa Engura*"-now known as Kapenguria, spreading in to areas of Kitale (*neni etalere ngidwe*) and further south-westwards to the present day Iteso areas of Kenya, Tororo and Busia in Uganda. This group continues to this present day, speaking a version of Ateso dialect, closer to the original *Nga'karimojong and or Nga'turukana*.

In attempts to explain the long standing conflict between Iteso and the Karimojong, a conflict ridden 'oral tradition narrative' is often advanced by some outsider commentators, scholars and administrators. They explain, *Karamoja* as a place where the Elderly perished (*Ekar Ngimojong*) because the young men and women- now known as Iteso refused to return to the Karamoja homesteads, with livestock, they had taken for grazing to distant pastures during the dry season. This group assert that the name 'Iteso' derives from the word '*Ates*'-graves, as a result of a curse by elders. But a more positive and plausible Oral tradition resonating within the ATEKER communities supported by the Map 2 above, however assert that while descending from Ethiopian Highlands in to the Lake Turkana basin of Elemi Triangle, the *Itesyio* ancestors were able to see lakes Kyoga, Opetta and Bisina water system and the


surrounding marshland of present day Teso of Uganda while they were on a raised ground of Ethiopia. They claimed to have said “*Itesyio ngina*” -literally meaning, *we are seeing and eying there*. Fixing their minds and motivated to reach the Lake Kyioga basin they had seen, the Itesyio (Iteso) people came to occupy present areas in Teso sub-region of Uganda.

Today, both the Iteso and Lango people of Uganda, possess identical names of clans, names of people and many words of same or nearer similar meanings with the rest of the core ATEKER groups. In fact for the Iteso people of both Kenya and Uganda, there is no need for any translations as the rest of the core Ateker communities of the Karimoja, Turkana, Toposa and Nyangatom can understand when they speak.\

1.1 THE NEXUS OF UNDER-DEVELOPMENT IN ‘ATEKER’ CROSS-BORDER COMMUNITIES OF KARAMOJA CLUSTER:

Over decades, the nomadic as well as the Agro-pastoral communities straddling across the Uganda-Kenya, Uganda-South Sudan, Kenya- South Sudan and Kenya- Ethiopia international borders, have for so long, remained at the periphery of state governance, socio-economic development efforts, service delivery and law and order enforcement efforts. They have in many respects remained backward, self regulating, and therefore, perpetually conflict ridden in the absence of strong state institutions. They have lived without effective control by their respective governments. They have for many decades, employed unlawful survival mechanisms such as the use of illegally acquired, small arms (AK47) for cattle raids, road thuggery and involvement general criminality. The sporadic and ferocious nature of these cattle raids, senseless killings, and robberies’ have contributed to the persistence of such cyclical low intensity (resources, and ethnic identity based) conflicts. These have mainly resulted from general ineffectiveness of state governance, weak law and order enforcement, non-existent border control and management institutions and personnel in the entire border lines in the region. Armed pastoralists and their livestock just cross international borders anyhow, anywhere and at any time both for peaceful grazing, and/ or for criminal cattle raiding expeditions. This therefore underlines the challenges which state institutions have faced over the years, in dismally attempting to maintain security, and enforce law and order among the ‘*Ateker*’ border peripheral communities-lying at the margins of their nation states.

Besides repeated attempts by these cross-border communities and their informal leaders, at initiating peace meetings and signing peace agreements, other cross-border peace actions, have continued to be initiated by formal government leaders supported by donors and CSOs.



1.1.1 Underlying Causes of Conflict and Insecurity among the ‘Ateker’ cross-border communities of Karamoja cluster and Implications for Wider Security and the Transformative Development Agenda:

“There can be no sustainable peace and security without development. And there can be no development without peace and security in Zone 3 lands.... Peace is an incentive to development and development is an incentive to peace”.

1.1.1.1. Cyclic Violent Conflict:

The Karamoja cluster (ICGLR Zone 3) or ‘Ateker’ communities, the nomadic and Agro-pastoralists occupy the peripheral semi-arid region of East and Horn of Africa. It is the most underdeveloped region in the country and as a result has a history of marginalization. Another distinctive feature of this region is that it is one of the most conflict-prone zones both in terms of resource- and ethnic identity-based conflicts which have in turn led to a level of criminality that has progressively paralysed the region over the last three decades.

This region has experienced recurrent widespread cattle rustling, lawlessness, criminality, road thuggery, banditry and general insecurity. The zone also suffered from the absence and weak presence of the state and its institutions as these could not function in an insecure environment.

There was a complete breakdown of rule of law and order. More so, it was unfortunate that, the customary institutions of governance that remained influential over the decades mostly reinforced the conflict paradigm of survival through their blessing of organized massive raids and destruction of lives and property both within the Ateker communities of Karamoja cluster and their neighbours.

For decades the violent conflicts were exacerbated by the proliferation and trade in illicit small arms, extreme poverty, chronic food insecurity caused by drought, limited access to basic education, water for livestock, health services, environmental degradation, and restricted access to rangelands for livestock mobility in conservation areas.



1.1.2. Militarization and Use of Force in Peace-making in the Region

Historically, successive governments have used military force to make peace and restore security in different parts of the rangelands occupied by ‘Ateker’ communities of the Karamoja- ‘cluster (ICGLR Zone 3). While many of the previous peace making attempts often met with mixed results, the recent UPDF disarmament military campaigns for in Karamoja, has largely registered significant success though at a high cost of human life and some reported human rights abuses. It must however be noted that although it has been both a patch work of success and failures, the UPDF disarmament campaigns have subdued the criminal elements and crippled their networks, allowed the state law and order enforcement agencies to penetrate deep and re-establish critical infrastructure to sustain the peace building in the region.

However, caution should be observed in the use of forceful disarmament efforts. It is globally recognized that in the long-term, voluntary peace actions seem to generate higher dividends in sustaining peace and promoting civilian peace building than the single use of force. Currently in Karamoja for instance, there is a need to strengthen the disarmament efforts by promoting a comprehensive civil military cooperation process so as to transform the current conditions of negative peace into a sustainable civilian-owned peace process.

1.1.3. Poor Access to Basic Services for Human and Livestock Survival

The Ateker communities of Karamoja cluster (ICGLR Zone 3) currently live in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) characterized by underdeveloped infrastructure of roads, water, sanitation, lack of telecommunication and electricity connectivity that are further worsened by poor access to basic social services such as education, human and animal health and virtually no employment opportunities. The Ateker people in these areas remain well below the national average in terms of all the human development indices (for example, among the Karimojong of Uganda, illiteracy stood at 87% and Human Development Index at 0.004 (UNDP 2000)).

1.1.4. Persistent Limitations in Government Policies and Practices

It follows that past and present policies run short of anchoring government authority and effectiveness in the region to organic societal institutions of governance that are rooted in the

cultural and social lives of the people. Since colonial times, militaristic and violent, *ad-hoc* and top-down approaches have been employed by various administrations. Local communities and their formal and informal leaders have long been spectators, not trusted, and isolated from the security and development processes. In April 2008, the GOU launched the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), designed to support UPDF and police efforts through introducing a robust government development, security and rule of law agenda. In addition the Re-establishment of Law and Order institutions in Karamoja (RELOKA) provided a civilian face to the military disarmament exercise.

1.1.5. Limited Engagement of Customary Institutions in Peace and Security Matters

The capacity of cultural elders, civil society and political leaders to effectively engage the state institutions in peace and security policy issues and service delivery remains weak and find it difficult to hold them accountable. This in some instances has promoted arbitrariness and impunity among the state security personnel and institutions. The customary institutions of the councils of elders, mobile kraals (*Adakar and Alomar*) leaders and age sets traditional system of *Akiriket* in general, that played a prominent role in adjudicating pastoral resource harvesting, conflict mediation and sometimes blessing of well-organized massive raids in the past, are now only spectators to the processes of enforcing peace and security in the region. There is need to re-mobilize these customary institutions so as to channel their heroism and influence to the promotion of peace, development and security.

1.1.6. The Lack of Harmonization of Formal and Customary Governance Systems

Two parallel authority structures exist among the ‘*Ateker*’ communities of the Karamoja cluster (ICGLR Zone 3):

- i. one being that of the customary elders propagated through sons and nephews and
- ii. the other the formal Member States government structures in the form of Central and Local Governments.

The traditional leadership system of elders has survived modernization and remains influential in the running of affairs in the villages- ‘*erre*’ and ‘*kraals*’- ‘*Ngawuyoi*’. They have not been constructively and sustainably engaged in the important matters of peace and security. While the local government structures are visible in urban areas, these structures

remain weak and are absent in the villages- '*Ngireria*' and *kraals*- '*Ngawuyoi*' which only visit for a few hours as rural tourists before retreating to enjoy their soft lives in town. In much of rural Karamoja cluster- '*Ateker*' (of ICGLR Zone 3) communities, the cultural elders are the lawmakers as well as the law enforcers. Because they are not linked to formal government structures, over the decades of armed conflict and criminality, they became a law unto themselves thus remaining unaccountable to the state. Therefore, since the initiation of a forceful disarmament processes this customary authority has lost its conflict balance and so must now be mobilized for peace and security under the aspirations of the collaborative peace and development activities of EAC member states.

1.1.7. Historical and International Dynamics of Regional State Instability, Globalization, Climatic Change, Liberalization and Arms Trade

International factors have also significantly contributed to the problem in the region. Colonialism is a major international factor at the root of problems in the region in that colonialists enforced boundaries that "*confused*" and did not take cognizance of the communal rangeland management systems that were effective in managing resource access for nomadic pastoral lives. Access to pastoral lands for wildlife conservation without community-benefit-arrangements also further limited resource access by nomadic pastoralists.

In the absence of mechanisms and institutional procedures for peaceful coexistence and regulated *sharing of 'common property resources'* such as *water, pasture, salt licks and social services, the orderly mobility process, and security services*, has over decades been a key factor in the rise in criminality. The current state of continued environmental degradation and global climatic change resulting in the variability of rangeland resources both in time and space, will most probably continue to be a source of resource-based conflict. This in effect means that senior leadership in the IC-GLR, IGAD, and EAC Members States, have to take lead in facilitating and *guaranteeing bi-lateral resource access and sharing arrangements* especially in the wake of drought and adverse effects of climate change in the '*Ateker*' areas of Karamoja- cluster (ICGLR Zone 3).

The lucrative trade in small arms and light weapons, through the Greater Horn of Africa-the Sudan-Kenya and Sudan-Uganda borders into Karamoja and West Pokot is a self-explanatory phenomenon that continues to reinforce insecurity and the need for effective security arrangements by IC- GLR, IGAD and EAC member states. It is important that the military

teams in Member States, the civil administrators, and all development partners including CSOs work together through an integrated approach to peace and development so as to successfully tackle the demand and supply factors fueling the small arms trade in the region..

2.0. IMPACT AND OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT AND INSECURITY IN ‘ATEKER’ CROSS-BORDER AREAS:

Box 1: Overview of the impact and key outcomes of pastoral conflict in Ateker communities of karamoja cluster (ICGLR Zone 3)

Economic:

- Loss of livestock as a result of reciprocal raiding and revenge raids.
- Loss of other property that is looted during the raids.
- Under-utilization of grazing land and water points because of lack of security.
- Spread of cattle diseases through raids.
- Insecurity of cattle markets and loss of trade opportunities.
- Induced marketing of animals at exploitation prices (i.e. distress sales).
- Lack of development of alternative economic activities (trade, tourism etc).

Political:

- Enforcement of ethnic identity and stereotyping which reinforces isolation and marginalization of nomadic pastoralists in Ateker communities (ICGLR Zone 3).
- Use of military force in attempted disarmament processes and incidences of human rights violations.
- Breakdown of democratization processes as insecurity undervalues civic engagement.
- Widening poverty and underdevelopment gap between pastoralists areas and the rest of non-pastoralist communities which are now enjoying peace, security and development.
- Entrenchment of customary systems of governance and security management which if not positively harnessed and integrated into governance, may not necessarily bring positive outcomes but instead, perpetuate conflict and undermine citizen accountability.

Social:

- Isolation and breakdown of social networks.
- Internal displacement and forced migration to cities.
- Poor social service delivery due to insecurity of routes and impossibility of outreach to nomadic pastoralists.
- Poverty, destitution and lack of opportunity for pastoral citizens.
- Multiple human rights violations and abuses.
- HIV/AIDS spread due to displacement, disoriented socialization
- Pervasive conflict and social differentiation

Environmental:

- Restriction of cattle grazing leading to localized over-grazing and environmental depletion.
- Poverty-induced deforestation and over-exploitation of natural resources.
- Pressure on national reserves.

3.0. THE SPECIFIC (VERBAL AND WRITTEN) PEACE AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY DIFFERENT 'ATEKER' CROSS-BORDER COMMUNITIES OF THE KARAMOJA CLUSTER SINCE THE LOKIRIAMA PEACE ACCORD OF 1973

3.1. ON THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SEVERAL PEACE AGREEMENTS:

The objective of cross-border peace initiatives and Agreements analyzed, shows a dichotomy of perceptions of what Governments and Communities see as urgent and should be addressed. Each of the main actors base their motivations for intervention actions in the search for peace and stability, on the two sets of imperatives:

- Governments follow the security (law and Order) and sovereignty imperative of peace actions while;**

ii. **The Communities, and non-state actors on their part follow the pursuit of *peaceful coexistence and resource access and sharing imperative.***

This divergence and lack of harmonization of the imperative objectives that motivate action by Government agencies and pastoral communities, clearly affect the outcomes of the different peace agreements reached and implemented. These imperatives also affect the sustainability of both the peace and commitments made during the peace processes and the concluded Peace agreements.

There is need for clear understanding on how best, *law and order (peace and security)* and *state sovereignty* imperatives, that continue to guide actions by the State Agencies and personnel, be harmonized with the *resource access/sharing* and *peaceful coexistence* imperatives pursued by pastoral communities in their engagements in the peace processes.

The harmonization of these underpinning motivations and desired end-states by state governments and cross-border community leaders should be done in a way that reinforces a more comprehensive concept of stability and transformational development. Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Resources sharing agreement mechanisms should be negotiated between state parties and should be owned by community leaders and their local governments among the peoples of ‘*Ateker*’ cross-border communities in the Karamoja cluster (IC GLR Zone 3). These should detail more elaborate steps and procedures for *safe, peaceful and orderly movement of livestock and people across borders and how they access and share resources, services, and economic opportunities and markets*. This is because state security plus human security (*i.e. freedom from fear and freedom from want*) will lead to sustainable stability, development and prosperity.

3.2. SPONSORS AND ACTORS OF THE NUMEROUS CROSS BORDER PEACE INITIATIVES EVALUATED.

The development partners and implementing CSOs, have been engaged both in the funding and implementation of peace agreements and peace actions in the ‘*Ateker*’ communities of the Karamoja –cluster (ICGLR Zone 3). These include: National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCKK), POKATUSA, DPC, ACTION AID, CJPC, MADEFO –Uganda, KOPEIN USAID, EU, DANIDA, Riam Riam, IRC, APAD (Kenya), LOCADO (Kenya), DADO, OXFAM, AEPDA, EPARDA, IGAD etc. Government actors in the peace processes in the

region have included Ministers for Défense and Security, Internal affairs, Members of Parliament, Resident District Commissioners, District Commissioners, Border Chiefs, Sub-county (LC3s), and District Chairpersons, and Customary (*traditional*) and Kraal (*adakar and alomar*) Leaders.

- It is clear from the above wide array of partnerships that there is a common consensus among both governments and development partners that peace and security are a key issue in the Ateker communities (ICGLR Zone 3 region).
- However, the lack of harmonization of guiding principles and desired end state with the lack of long-term funding resource commitments for sustained implementation of peace dialogues and community projects have undermined these robust efforts.

3.3. TYPES OF STRATEGIES EMPLOYED IN THE DIFFERENT PEACE PROCESSES IN THE REGION INCLUDE:

- Although the peace meetings where peace agreements, pacts, or protocols and communiqués would be signed differed from one peace processes to another, these peace meetings have however often been, held on *an adhoc basis and in more of crisis situations*.
- The common circumstances that create the need for peace meetings are insecurity and violence occasioned by cattle raids and killings.
- Many governments and CSOs peace actions have been undertaken through organized workshops.
- Commendable research has also been done in nomadic pastoral communities on their livelihoods, poverty and conflict dynamics. However, the harmonization of these research processes and utilization of their findings is yet to be fully employed to inform the peace building and security efforts on ground.
- Bi-lateral Inter-State diplomacy has also been applied over international cross-border incidents of insecurity and these have often been largely successful though kept in confidence from wider public.

- The application of military operations has also been used along the Uganda-Kenya border corridor in cases related to risks of small arms entry into Uganda which is undertaking disarmament process at the moment.
- Culture and traditional religiosity, permeates all aspects of nomadic pastoralists lives. It is therefore common to undertake certain customary rites and perform certain traditional rituals during peace meetings.

3.4. EXPOSITION OF THE DIFFERENT PEACE AGREEMENTS IN DETAIL

A detailed look at the emerging trends on each of the specific peace processes and resultant agreements among the ‘*Ateker*’ communities of the Karamoja cluster follows in the succeeding pages bellow.

A. FROM MOUNT ELGON -TO- MOUNT MOROTO.

3.4.1. KATIKEKILE PEACE AGREEMENT 1992, UGANDA.

- **This agreement was signed** between the Pokot of West Pokot (Kenya) and the Karimojong-Tepeth of Moroto (Uganda). The agreement was signed to address the *issues of insecurity caused by raids and killings_and to address the issues of sharing pasture and water*. This agreement was initiated by the young people and elders of the two communities, the governments of Kenya and Uganda and CSOs doing peace work in the region participated.
- **The issues discussed** at this cross-border peace dialogue were *peace, grazing fields and water points, land for agriculture, education and drought*.
- This was a verbal agreement and was memorized by both communities.
- The council of elders and the kraal leaders made a commitment that the resolutions passed will be implemented.
- **It was agreed that** community corporal punishment would be administered to those who violated this agreement. Penalties agreed upon for violations of the agreement included:
 - death compensation of 30 heads of cattle,
 - a fine of two cows was to be administered for each cow stolen,
 - the community was to administer corporal punishment to the offenders,
 - repeat offenders were to be arrested and handed over to state law and security enforcement agencies of the military and or police.
- **Social and economic infrastructure** that could enhance peace were identified and these included:
 - the free grazing of livestock between the two country borders,
 - enrolment of school children from the two tribes in same schools,
 - opening of security road by both the Governments of Kenya and Uganda,
 - the drilling of bore holes and the construction of water pans.
- The **level of collaboration and information sharing** was commendable within communities affected by the conflict, government and CSO stake holders.
- Custom was applied with the slaughter of bulls for administering the peace oaths and the burying of war instruments.

- **This agreement stood for eight years.**
 - Penalties in form of fines on offenders were implemented,
 - schools were opened,
 - bore holes were drilled in Uganda and one dam was constructed at Nasal-Kenya in 2007,
 - the government of Uganda constructed security roads and opened the security road through Loroo.
 - The Government of Uganda on the other hand quickly drilled bore holes and
 - Government of Uganda also opened a school in Katikekile.
 - the two communities did not raid or kill each other in this period of eight years.
- **Shortfalls of the Kitikekile Peace Agreement of 1992:**

What remained unresolved was:

- the lack of security roads and bore holes from the Kenya side.
- The Kenya government did not meet its obligation in this respect.
- ***In conclusion***, this agreement seems to have contributed to a significant calm and peace between the Pokot of Kenya and Karimojong of Uganda. However, limited government political will and challenges of government administration of this peripheral area seem to have undermined lasting peace.

3.4.2. THE NASAL, KENYA AND LOROO, UGANDA AGREEMENT OF 2002

- This agreement was signed to address a range of issues including **insecurity, poverty caused by cattle rustling, cross-border market places, pasture and water points** in Uganda for Pokot cattle, **resettlement and farming across the border, the outbreak of livestock diseases and** socio-economic infrastructure (schools, water, business, health centers etc) to enhance peaceful co-existence.
- This agreement was facilitated by Peace Committees and Development Partners. The peace committee members included NCCK, POKATUSA, DPC, ACTION AID, CIPC and MADEFO in Uganda.
- In the analysis of this agreement, it was found that peace committee meetings were only reactionary to incidents.

- The roles of the Peace Committee members are expected to identify and expose the raiders, recover stolen cattle and hand them over to their owners, involve law enforcement agencies in case of conflict incidents.
- Customary rituals were applied during peace committee meetings.
- **This agreement facilitated several positive socio-economic processes.**
 - The schools of Loroo, Nasal, Nawoyapong and Katikikile were re-opened,
 - The health centers in Nawoyapong and dispensaries reopened.
 - Loroo health center was constructed on Uganda side,
 - security servicemen were deployed, 15 Administration Police, Police and UPDF were deployed at Nawoyapong and the border of Uganda respectively.
 - Communities started to resettle in previously insecurity affected areas of Loroo, Nasal, Nawoyapong and Katikekile.
 - Markets opened in Nasal and Loroo.
 - Communities embarked on farming activities.
 - The Government of Uganda constructed security roads along the borders.
- ***Shortfalls of commitments to the Nasal-Loroo Peace Agreement:***
- It is evident that this agreement met with challenges from the Kenya side.
 - The number of security officers deployed to cover the vast area of west Pokot was inadequate.
 - To date the Kenya Government had not constructed and has not drilled the bore holes foreseen in the agreement.
 - Saasak and Kasses villages though highly populated did not get bore holes due to its aridity and no options were explored.
 - The mobilization of resources from the Kenya Government required to implement the points in the agreement has not been effectively done to-date (2009).

3.4.3. THE OCHORICHOR PEACE AGREEMENT OF 2006 – UGANDA

- ***The women of West Pokot initiated this agreement*** and it was facilitated by CSOs and the two governments of Kenya and Uganda.
- ***Key cross-border peace dialogue issues that were discussed*** at this agreement were, *causes of the conflict (raiding and killing), insecurity, peaceful co-existence, revenge,*

raping of women and girls during raids, education and alternative livelihoods (business and farming).

- The women also invited men into the peace process and verbal commitment on peace and co-existence were made for two years.
- The women were also committed to discouraging their men from organizing raids and were to participate in the recovery of stolen livestock.
- Women contribution to the peace dialogue also extended to the implementation of the agreed measure of compensation for deaths (loss of Human Life) with a penalty of 40-60 cows for one youth killed and 30 for one elder.
- Women also advocated for joint markets, re-opening of schools, engagement of women in church services and farming.
- ***The Positive impact or achievements of this agreement*** was such that:
 - for two years peace ensued.
 - Schools were opened in Loroo.
 - Communities resettled in Lopedot and Ochorichor farms and
 - many women came to believe in Christianity.
- ***Challenges faced by the Achorichor Peace Agreement:***

Inspite of the significant successes of this peace agreement, a couple of factors undermined its sustainability. What remained unresolved were:

- *the continued theft of livestock on a small scale and the non recovery of some of the stolen livestock.*
- In addition, the peace meetings were not frequently held.
- *The vast district of west Pokot as well as the Karamoja region across the border is far from central government administration.*
- The *multiplicity of clans in Karamoja* side created multiple challenges for the peace processes in general. It is a big challenge to effect peace agreements with all the clans at the same time.
- Therefore, the arrangements of peace agreements with only some clans at any one time means that other clans in the Karamoja cluster can go on raiding and killing while other peace agreements with some compliant clans are running.

3.4.4. KANYERUS PEACE AGREEMENT MAY 2007- KENYA

- ***The Kanyerus agreement was initiated by*** the chairman of Bukwa District Peace Committee.
- ***The objective of this agreement was to discourage youth from raiding and cattle thefts, control cross-border small arms trafficking through lobbying government to undertake control of small arms trafficking through law enforcement.***
- And the agreement was also signed for both the Turkana and Pokot to re-settle along the border.
- ***The Positive impact or achievements of the agreement*** is that to date:
 - The resettlement has been effected on the border side.
 - A border road from Grik River to Bukwa in Ugandan has been constructed.
 - Some schools have also been constructed on the border side of Uganda.
 - It must be noted that the positive impact of this agreement is to a large extent contributed by the successes of the disarmament process in Uganda and the current strict security arrangements by UPDF in Karamoja and Bukwa region.
- ***The challenges faced by Kanyerus Peace Agreement:***

This was yet another verbal agreement between the Pokot and the Sabiny and there is no documentation of process and issues.

- Allegedly peace spoilers continue to play an active role in the communities and
- the irregular cross border dialogue,
- the absence of sustainable cross-border interaction continues to undermine the potential of social cohesion of the two communities.
- The foreseen resettlement, spiritual pacification, construction of school health units and water points and the expected joint disarmament exercise remains elusive.
- The Kenya Government has not fulfilled its obligation to mobilize communities for peace unilaterally, disarm the Pokot, deploy the Kenya army and control cattle rustling.
- It has also been difficult to involve the Pokot cultural spiritual leaders (*Laibones*) in pro-peace dialogue.

- Youth who actively engage in raids from the Pokot side have not been actively participating in peace dialogues and yet their participation is paramount.
- It is concluded by the Sabiny peace community actors on the Uganda side that these peace agreements have been strategic in nature and are only honoured when the Pokot need pasture and water thus undermining confidence and trust in peace processes.
- Overall, the monitoring mechanism for this agreement is missing and therefore the sustainability of the peace dialogue is limited.

3.4.5. KANYERUS AGREEMENT SEPTEMBER 2007

- ***This was yet again a verbal agreement*** at which *cursing ceremonies* were performed to bring death to any one who would continue with raiding.
- The discussion at this agreement was that there should be no more raids and that those involved will suffer the consequences of the curse.
- Another issue discussed was that the Pokot of Kenya be allowed to graze in Uganda during times of drought provided they make formal requests to the central Government of Uganda.
- Tracking of stolen animals and prevention of resale of stolen animals was another issues discussed at this meeting.
- Disarmament of the Pokot of Kenya,
- resettlement of communities and alternative livelihood sources like farming in fertile lands was discussed.
- ***The impact of this agreement was that as*** a result there was:
 - a reduction in raids and relative peace was achieved.
 - There was sharing of resources of water and pasture land.
 - There was an improvement in cross border interaction and the resettlement and farming processes had started.
 - Security personnel were deployed on both sides of the border by both the Government of Kenya and Uganda and the Kanyerus Police Post was built.
 - In addition, a dam was constructed and a bore hole was drilled.
 - The disarmament process through voluntary handing over of guns was initiated.
 - There was recruitment for KPR and security roads were also constructed.

- ***Challenges of the Kanyerus Peace Agreement of September 2007*** included:
 - the post-election violence in Kenya has affected the commitment of the Government of Kenya to implement this agreement.
 - In addition, there is general lack of financial resources to conduct peace meetings.
 - In terms of security of property, there are still minor cases of cattle theft which eventually can build up to major hostilities.
 - There were reported incidences of some harassment of Pokot herdsmen by the UPDF and this could undermine cross border confidence in the peace process.

3.4.6. LOBOBORE DECLARATION AT KANYAO 2006

- ***This declaration was at Kanyao, Ngotu Village in 2006.***
- This declaration was made by the Pokot of Kenya and the Sabiny of Uganda.
- The main issues in this declaration were that these two communities live in harmony.
- ***Also this declaration discussed the issue*** of promoting peaceful co-existence between the Pokot and the Karimojong.
- At the meeting it was also agreed that the Pokot resettle in Lokales, Kanyerus and Loporokocha plains.
- The peace declaration also reached a consensus that voluntary disarmament would be carried out by both the Governments of Uganda and Kenya.
- Finally, it was agreed that there should be peaceful co-existence in all communities.
- ***Challenges to the Lobobore Declaration***
 - Resettlement was not done.
 - Communities report that some parts of the agreement were not implemented as those parts were sabotaged by the Pokot and Sabiny cattle rustlers who allegedly formed a coalition for raiding.
 - There ensued constant atmosphere of insecurity caused by the raiders.
 - The vast area of Pokot district makes it challenging to the governments to effect policing and provide adequate security to manage cross border pastoral conflict.

3.4.7. SUAM DECLARATION NOVEMBER 2006 – UGANDA

- ***This agreement was also signed between the Pokot and the Sabiny.***
- ***The main issue discussed*** was the recovery of stolen livestock and compensation for deaths and stolen livestock.
- At the declaration the Pokot community of Kenya formally requested from the Sabiny *access to watering points and pasture.*
- Both communities discussed *alternative livelihood* sources such as farming and business.
- They discussed encouraging *children to attend the joint schools and*
- *the deployment of security personnel along the border.*
- The declaration also addressed the issue of *both Governments of Kenya and Uganda being non-partisan* in dealing with cattle rustlers and
- that both governments should *facilitate branding of animals.*
- ***The Positive impact or achievements of the Suam agreement of November 2006*** were that:
 - the two governments deployed security personnel along the borders and
 - security roads were opened,
 - schools were also re-opened at Katikomor in Kenya and Chebinyong in Uganda.
- ***Challenges of the agreement:*** Most of the other things agreed on remained unimplemented and these included:
 - alternative livelihoods and trade,
 - joint security management of cattle rustling and
 - the branding of livestock by both governments.

3.4.8. SUAM DECLARATION NOVEMBER 2007 – UGANDA

- ***This agreement was a follow up of the above declaration.***
- It centred on two issues:
 - *Cross-border communication and collaboration between the authorities of the two governments and*
 - *the apprehension of cattle raids and thefts.*

- It must be noted that this Suam agreement is much more of a security agreement between the two countries.
- Follow up dialogue to the agreement was commendable and the agreement attracted very high-profile level of commitment between the two governments of Uganda and Kenya.
- The inclusion of CSOs in the agreement process and the sharing of information was good.
- In the details of the agreement it was agreed that there will be bi-weekly meetings,
- deployment of troops and recovery of stolen cattle across the two borders.

Positive Impact of this follow-up Suam Declaration was such that:

- there was increased security deployment and surveillance as well as
- increased resettlement was done on the Ugandan side.

Challenges faced by the Suam Declaration again included:

- *the* ineffectiveness by the Government of Kenya to meet its agreement obligations.
- In addition, there was the lack of adequate financial and technical resources to implement quick response to attacks (raids) and convene cross-border meetings.
- The socio-economic infrastructure that would boost social cohesion and increased trade opportunities on non-conflict items along the borders has also not been constructed as foreseen in the Declaration.

3.4.9. CHEPCHOINA DECLARATION 2002

The participants in this peace meeting were RDCs, DCs, CSOs, ACTION AID, PEDP, NCCCK, DPC and also Pokot and Sabiny leaders.

- ***This peace declaration was between the Pokot and the Sabiny and centred on issues of:***
 - conflicts and recovery of stolen animals,
 - malicious killings,
 - construction of secure roads and re-opening of schools for the children of both communities to attend.

- In addition, the meeting discussed and agreed on the need to revive security posts,
- construct the bridge at Kariol and Cheptunonyo,
- opening of a joint market at Chepan and Kanyerus and
- a formal request for permission for pasture and water points in Sabiny, Uganda by the Pokot herdsmen.
- ***The Positive Impact of the Chepchoina Declaration:*** As a result of this agreement:
 - administrative police posts were opened in Katikomor and Kanyerus.
 - Also security roads opened in Kanyarwak, Cepchoima areas and
 - Katikomor Boys' school was re-opened.
 - There was recovery of previously stolen animals in 2006. To be precise, 500 cows were impounded in Pokot to compensate for 40 cows stolen from the Sabiny.
 - A girl by the name of Winnie who had been abducted by the Pokot in 2002 was returned to her parents on 27th January 2005 and
 - a fine of 40 cows was implemented as penalty for the crime of abduction of this girl.
- ***Challenges faced by this Declaration:***
 - The two governments of Kenya and Uganda did not undertake the joint tracking of stolen animals as was foreseen.
 - This reflected on limited political will of the two governments to the provisions of this particular declaration.
 - On the armed nomadic pastoralists side, raiding was managed in a complex manner in which raiders migrated from one village to another thus making the tracking of stolen animals difficult even if security personnel attempted to do so.
 - In addition, it was very difficult to effect the recovery process of stolen animals as there were no clear details in regards to numbers, size and health status of animals stolen.
 - Communities stated that the Government of Kenya did not drill boreholes on their side of the border as had been agreed at the declaration and there were also no health centres at the Kenya side.

- The communities also felt that at this time the security personnel from the UPDF of Uganda were partisan in their ways of handling peace and security matters.

3.4.10. LOKALEES AGREEMENT, 2007

- ***This agreement was reached in 2007 between the Pokot, Sabiny and the Pian.***
- It was agreed that trade in small arms should be controlled and guns in the hands of armed civilians handed to the government as small arms were seen as the cause of conflict.
- In the same Agreement, it was agreed that there should be a *sharing of pasture and water for the animals during dry seasons.*
- It was also agreed that those guilty of livestock theft should be exposed to law enforcement agencies in the area to be arrested.
- ***The Positive Impact of the Lokales Peace Agreement*** is that:
 - Since 2007, the peace accord is followed to a large extent.
 - There is peace and no more organized massive raids that have been registered.
 - What happens now are incidences of cattle thefts.
 - The issue of pasture and water sharing has been resolved between the Pokot, Sabiny and the Pian.
 - Also most trade routes were opened and this is evident in that the Pian take the cattle for sale in Orwolwa in Kacheliba which is a cattle market on the Kenya side.
 - The three communities of Pokot, Sabiny and Pian are grazing and trading together.
 - Inter-marriages have taken place especially on the side of the Pokot marrying Sabiny women.
 - Generally, there is now peaceful co-existence.
 - This positive situation is further supported by the successes of the UPDF led disarmament campaign on the Uganda side and the deployment of Police personnel on the Kenya side.
- ***The Challenges: a number of issues remain unresolved and therefore pose challenges to total gains from the Lokalees Agreement:***
 - The trade route between the Pokot and the Sabiny has not yet been opened.

- During the agreement in 2007 it was agreed and arrived that the land between the two communities of Sabiny and Pokot be used as a farm land as a Peace Connector.
- But Government of Uganda gazetted the land in question for wild game, hence making that part of the agreement unresolved.
- Some Pokot of Kenya commit theft and then seek refuge in Uganda. This back and forth movement of wrong elements is a threat to the peace process.
- Some of the youth in the communities concerned are reluctant to fully commit to peace and still wish to involve themselves in gun related crimes.
- A key problem is the lack of financial and technical resources to facilitate regular peace meetings.

4.11. KARITA PEACE AGREEMENT 2003

- ***In 2003 an agreement was arrived at in Karita between the Pokot, Sabiny and the Pian.***
- It was agreed that the three communities live in peace, inter-marry and trade jointly.
- This meeting was facilitated by POKATUSA.
- The main issues discussed in this meeting were:
 - livestock grazing during the dry spell,
 - areas of grazing and identification of shared water points.
 - The elders of the three communities were sent for negotiation with neighbours.
 - The communities also discussed the tracking, recovery and returning of the stolen livestock.
- ***The positive impact of this peace agreement was that a number of issues were resolved including:***
 - sharing of grazing and watering areas,
 - the Pokot are now farming in Naporokocha,
 - trade is going on in Orolwa, trade issues have been followed up on and three markets have been opened in Girik in Lokalees Parish, Namulu and Orolwa market in Kaceliba.
 - Currently most Pian women are married in Karita and some Pian are in Orolwa for trade.

- This meeting also sought to reflect the discussion from previous agreements where there were provisions with the Sabiny about a joint grazing area and a proposal that the Pokot should farm at Naporokocha.
- ***The challenges to the peace agreement include:***
 - presence of peace spoilers and cattle thefts cases.
 - In addition, much as there is peace between the Pokot and Sabiny, and the Pokot and Pian, there is need still for peace to be made between the Pian and the Sabiny.
 - There is still an on-going conflict as this agreement was between the two tribes separately.
 - Another challenge is there are internal struggles as there are few individuals who want to be the only actors in the peace process.
 - There is need to broaden the participants to the peace process so that the peace process is based on consensus of all the territorial tribes.

3.4.12. KARITA PEACE PROCESS 2007-2008

- Notably, in this event, the Sabiny refused to turn up in the October 2007 proposed peace meeting in Lokales.
- The Sabiny also decreed in February 2008 that the Pokot animals shall not cross to their side of border river.
- ***The challenges to the Karita peace process are that:***
 - leaders of Pokot seem to be eager to have peace with the Sabiny but it is not clear as to whether the leaders from Sebei are in favour of this venture.
 - Cattle thieves continue to bring the insecurity and uncertainty of sustainable peace among the two communities.
 - There is also limited security guarantees from the military and this has left communities in a state of worry.
 - There are negative perceptions among the Sabiny towards the Pokot.
 - In addition, the youth “*ngikaracunas*” remain a problem in the peace process.
 - Communities also express that there is some political interference in the peace process especially from the Sebei side as there are those who have a negative attitude towards the Pokot and have no confidence in the peace process.

B. FROM MOUNT MOROTO -TO- THE TRI-POINT OF UGANDA-SOUTH SUDAN AND KENYA.

3.4.13. LOKIRIAMA PEACE ACCORD 18TH NOVEMBER 1973 (TURKANA AND MATHENIKO)

- *This accord was made between the Turkana and the Matheiko in November of 1973, and later revitalized and commemorated in 2003 and 2007.*
- This was made possible by the Turkana Kraal leader Ekeno Lolupkongu and Matheniko kraal leader Mangat Apaloris.
- These two key leaders saw the need of making the communities embark on peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding. And in order to consolidate their Peace agreement, they decided to perform a cultural ritual of burying the hatchet and this was symbolized by the disposal of spears, arrows and bows that are seen as instruments of death.
- This marked the start of good relationships between the Matheniko and Turkana communities .
- The Bokora, Tepeth and Jie emulated the example of the Peace pact between the Matheniko and Turkana and joined the two in the commemoration of the 1973 *Lokirama peace Accord* in 2003 at Lokirama (Kenya) peace monument and in 2007 at Nakiloro (Uganda).
- *The provisions of the renewed peace pact included:*
 - peaceful co-existence,
 - shared resource access of pasture, water and salt licks and
 - the ending of Cattle raiding and killings.

The Positive impact of the Lokirama Peace Accord include:

- The indiscriminate killings of women and children falling victims of cattle raids circumstances, reduced significantly.
- Joint cross border schools were established.
- The two communities and respective governments built a sales yard in Lokirama and Nakiloro (Uganda) and joint market days.

- A plan to have a similar peace (pact) accord in Lorengekipi (Turkana) to include the Pokot too.
- There are also joint health centres including use of referral hospitals across the border.
- In addition, many peace action plans were developed and various community dialogues conducted and undertaken across the borders.
- Access roads were constructed where there were none, before and also the recovery, return and handing over of stolen animals was enforced.
- There was established the practice of exposure and arresting of perpetrators of conflict by their respective parents and relatives which did discourage communities from harbouring perpetrators of conflict in the grazing corridors- this was evident in the return of camels from North Pokot on May 2008.
- Joint water points and shared grazing areas were identified and implemented. This has impacted positively on the economic well being of pastoralists.
- The communities also resolved to diversify their sources of livelihoods from livestock and started some trading activities.
- The peace accord has also promoted cross border dialogue and social cohesion between the communities of Turkana, Tepeth and Matheniko.
- NGOs and governments of the Uganda and Kenya have acknowledged the significant achievements of the Lokirama peace accord.
- For the last several occasions of the annual commemoration of the Lokirama peace accord, both the NGOs and local governments in Karamoja and Turkana, have provided political and financial resource support to the peace process.

The Lokirama Peace Accord 1973 is now looked like a model example to be emulated in the making of other peace agreements across the nomadic pastoralist communities facing conflict.

- *The challenges facing the Lokirama Peace Accord of 1973 and the unresolved issues:*
- There was lack of full representation of women efforts in peace building initiatives.
- The initial Instability in the area did not allow full women participation for fear of their insecurity.

- The communities did not have an effective communication system like telephone services, emails, fax and means of transport.
- Consequently, there was limited information sharing in time to respond to emerging conflicts.
- The Peace Committees were not effective in monitoring and recording of incidents of small-scale thefts due to lack of technical and funding support to the peace committees.
- Another challenge emerged as the commercialization of cattle raids, which expanded the actors and clientele of raiding in the region.
- Politics in the region also gave cattle rustling a new impetus and complexities rendering the elimination of violent conflict and cattle raids difficult to manage.
- Cultural perspectives on livestock ownership and context of the pastoral lifestyle with limited options in ASAL also made cross border cattle rustling persistent.
- In addition, the progressive proliferation of small arms across the Pokots and other pastoral communities from the horn of Africa to the Ateker communities in the Karamoja cluster, fueled the conflict. This landscape of increasing armament created a phenomenon of shifting criminal alliances among the criminally minded elements in the Ateker pastoral communities. This continued to play a major role in perpetuation of cross border cattle conflict.
 - i.e. The Tepeth and the Pokot alliances factor, Turkana and the Matheniko alliance against the Bokora-Jie, and sometimes the Jie-Bokora alliances against the Mathenico-Turkana etc.
 - The forming of criminal alliances was mostly with a single objective: to stage massive counter cattle raids on the perceived opponent community with disastrous results.
- As the landscape of the stability of the nomadic pastoralist communities, was changing for worse, this was reinforced by weak governance and administrative structures as these nomadic communities lie in the peripheral areas of the two countries with limited span of government control from the central government capital cities.
- The lack of access roads to curb insecurity through timely response and conflict event monitoring, further limited the success of the Lokirama Pact.

3.4.14. REVITALIZATION OF LOKIRIAMA PEACE ACCORD 2003 (TURKANA AND MATHENIKO)

- This was a follow up agreement to the one signed in 1973 when the Matheniko and the Turkana came together towards peace and security and sharing of livestock resources.
- They had also agreed to organize livestock marketing and continuous peace meetings to avoid the re-insurgence of conflict.
- The key customary (traditional) and government leaders reinforced previous provisions of the Lokirama agreement and advised the remaining conflict-ridden communities in the ‘Ateker’ communities of Karamoja cluster, to emulate good practices from this agreement with the view of enhancing peaceful relationships among the entire Karamoja cluster.
- Before then, the conflict between these two communities(Turkana and Karamoja) was seen from the perspective of two war-like communities engaging in an acceptable culture of cattle raiding and violence as of olden days.
- The re-think of community values towards peace and security then shaped the thinking and intervention of the widened Lokirama peace accord commemoration of 2003 and 2007.
- ***From the Lokirama Revitalization Peace Accord of 2003, the following positive results were evident: There was a consensus on:***
 - legal cross border positive understanding by the two governments that had differed previously in matters of peace and security and movement of people across-borders.
 - There came evidence of harmonization of approaches in planning on peace and security matters between the two countries of Kenya and Uganda.
 - Environmental issues came to the top of the agendas of peace discussions because drought then came to be seen as a key factor creating further vulnerability of pastoral households and contributing to cattle raids and insecurity.
 - Programmes on drought management were initiated across the region by bi-lateral donors and NGOs.
- However, the peace accord provisions could not all be implemented due to lack of technical support and financial resources.

- The continued proliferation of illegal arms as a result of unmanned porous international borders meant more small arms were being acquired by civilians in the region and used for cattle raiding and theft.
- The process of sharing information for peace became polarized towards alliances for raiding.
- ***The other shortfalls (Challenges) of the agreement*** were that the provisions to have joint schools at the border, access security roads to the insecure areas of the region and targeted deployment of security personnel at the border areas and along transhumance routes were not fully effected.

3.4.15. THE NAKILORO PEACE AGREEMENT COMMOMERATION OF REVITALIZED LOKIRIAMA ACCORD ON 28TH OCTOBER 2007

- ***In this peace meeting the issues on the agenda were:***
 - the recovery of the stolen animals and
 - the clearing of thickets along sections of the international road (by each of the two governments of Kenya and Uganda) as a way of creating secure environment and encouraging cohesion to allow cross-border communities to interact and trade with each other.
 - Part of the outcome of this peace agreement is the identification of peace connectors such as use of “*Sports for peace*” now an annual event like the Tegla Lorupe Peace Race.
 - The UPDF led disarmament process is currently on-going in Karamoja.
 - Also, the process of branding of animals in Karamoja is on-going as a security measure.
 - After this agreement was signed, there followed a relative peace that enabled free movement of people between the two countries of Kenya and Uganda
- ***The full implementation of the provisions of this agreement was hampered by:***
 - resource constraints including the lack of vehicles for transportation of participants and monitoring of the provisions of the agreements.
 - A community practice like exorbitant marriage bride prices which is an incentive for men to go for raids was not an issue discussed and resolved.

- The issue of public transparency on the side of the two governments (Kenya and Uganda) and complaints of human rights violations and abuses by government security agencies were highlighted by communities.
- To date, there are still some more incidents of cattle thefts across the border of Uganda and Kenya.
- **A key challenge is that whereas the Disarmament process is on-going in Karamoja, Uganda, there is no disarmament policy being implemented in Kenya.**
 - This means that there is yet no agreed provision for the harmonized disarmament of armed nomadic pastoralists by the two countries.
 - Another challenge is poor road networks and general marginal locations of the pastoral communities in areas of conflict that makes them hard to reach by government security and administrative agencies.

3.4.16. MOROTO 1 COMMUNIQUÉ AND LOKIRIAMA PROTOCOL 2007

Through these protocols, the two governments of Kenya and Uganda and the affected communities agreed on several principal issues of peace and security some of which are working to date. These issues include:

- the reinforcement of the KPR policy on Kenya side and militia/LDU policy on the Uganda side.
- There is now a mechanism in place for easy identification of stolen cattle,
- reduction of retaliatory raids and
- exposure and arrest of perpetrators of conflict.
- The UPDF led disarmament process is utilizing some of the provisions of these peace and security agreement as it tracks and recovers stolen livestock.
- ***The challenges to these peace pacts.*** However, some of the issues that remain unsolved and are still a challenge to the provisions of the peace agreement and protocol include:
 - there are still occurrences of small-scale thefts due to the availability of small arms in the hands of civilians combined with
 - other factors fueling conflict such as political incitement.
 - the commercialization of the raided cattle by the Matheniko and other Karimojong groups. Difficult to trace and recover stolen cattle that have immediately been sold off.

- the dishonesty of inflation and exaggeration of numbers of raided cattle.
- none diversification of livelihoods among nomadic pastoralists,
- inadequate security personnel at porous and volatile hot-spots to monitor conflict trends and proliferation of small arms into respective countries,
- different cross border policies,
- inadequate logistical support and
- inadequate information sharing.

3.4.17. NAWOUNITOS (TURKANA) PEACE DIALOGUE 2005

- **The participants** of this peace dialogue were the Government leaders of both Kenya and Uganda, the priests, CSOs (DADO, LOKADO and KOPEIN, a delegation of Sudan (Toposa) representative and Community members (Dodoth and Turkana)
- **The issues discussed at this peace meeting were:**
 - peace between Dodoth and Turkana,
 - disarmament,
 - arresting and detention of cattle raiders,
 - sharing of water and pasture after formal request and community agreements i.e. Turkana were to send delegation first (*etamam*) to Kaabong before they are accepted to graze in Uganda.
 - The issues of rape of women and girls,
 - grazing cattle in crop gardens,
 - abduction and killings.
 - As a result of this agreement, relative peace was attained between the two communities.

3.4.18. PEACE MEETING HELD IN KALAPATA SUB COUNTY (KAABONG) IN OCTOBER 2007

- After this meeting, Fr. Bernard of Oropoi catholic parish in Turkana, was unfortunately shot dead on his way to Kaabong.
- ***The issues discussed at the peace meeting were:***
 - peace and co-existence between the Dodoth and Turkana.

- A Turkana Kraal leader called Erayaragete was cautioned to stop his criminal alliance with the Jie for mounting raids against the Dodoth.
- The disarmament exercise started in Karamoja and it is still on going.
- The recovery of livestock e.g Turkana calves stolen by Dodoth thieves were recovered and handed over to the Turkana.
- Relative peace was realized whereby both Turkana and Dodoth people mixed up together,
- intermarriages and exchange of goods was done.
- ***The Unresolved issues*** included that:
 - the Turkana refused to leave their guns behind (in Kenya while coming for pasture and water in Uganda.
 - Turkana herdsmen continued to rape women.
 - The (Turkana) continued to abduct people (Dodoth communities) and later ended up slaughtering them for their witchcraft practices e.g. a man could be cut into two halves and they (Turkana) could pass through in between the halves with their livestock.
 - Grazing of animals in gardens continued.
 - Nomadic pastoralists continued to own guns illegally.
 - Drought has created successive crop failures in the last four years and famine is eminent.
 - There was thereafter a break out of livestock diseases.
 - There are also ethnic groupings that face language barriers-eg the ik etc
 - The boarder divisions and lack of confidence on both sides makes people suspicious almost all the time.
 - To-date, disarmament has not been done on Turkana side.

3.4.19. KAPOETA PEACE AGREEMENT OF MAY 2008– SOUTHERN SUDAN AND THE KALAPATA PEACE AGREEMENT OF JUNE 2008, KABONG DISTRICT – UGANDA

- The issues discussed at these agreements were:
 - Constructions of roads from Karenga in Uganda to Bira in southern Sudan, and from Kapedo in Uganda to Lotukei Southern Sudan.

- That disarmament should be implemented in all the three countries of Kenya, Sudan and Uganda.
- countries pledged to the recovery and handover of stolen animals.
- Other infrastructures needed to be improved including-water sources.
- The peace meetings also encouraged the participation of the youth and elders in the future peace process.

3.4.20. THE MBALE PEACE MEETING OF MAY 2008 – UGANDA

- At this meeting it was resolved that it was important to:
 - maintain cross border peace between the Karamojong and Kenya neighbouring communities.
 - It is also observed that to-date, peace between Didinga of Sudan and Dodoth of Uganda has been maintained.
 - The recovery and hand over of Turkana animals has often been done.
- What remains unresolved and challenging are the following:
 - the Dodoth of Uganda and Turkana still raid each other.
 - Total disarmament and control of small arms proliferations is still elusive. Kenya government has not begun the disarmament among the Turkana.
 - Due to the marginal nature of the Ateker -IC-GLR Zone 3 cross-border areas, there is still a problem of poor communication due to lack of telecommunication network.
 - There is lack of proper co-ordination by both governments of Uganda and Kenya on disarmament.
 - Drought which often leads to famine and hunger undermines peace processes.
 - There are still occasions of the abductions of women and girls and
 - the lack of identity cards of the different citizens of the countries.

3.4.21. LODIKO PARISH PEACE AGREEMENT 2005

This was mainly organized by the women as a result of an outcry of long suffering and prevalent insecurity.

- It was aimed at enabling the Dodoth people to come up with a way of peaceful co-existence with some of their neighbours.

- ***The participants in the peace agreement were:***
 - area local councillors and community members,
 - CSOS (DADO),
 - Kraal leaders,
 - LC.III chairperson and LCV chairpersons.
- ***Issues discussed include at this peace agreement were:***
 - peaceful co-existence and
 - the promotion of trade across the border as it used to be in the previous years when peace prevailed between the Dodoth and Turkana.
 - It was also the concern of the peace agreement to encourage the “Ngikaracuna” (Youth) and elders to join the women’s’ group in singing songs that promotes peace in communities.
 - The meeting also discussed about ways of encouraging parents to take children to school and
 - resource sharing of water and pasture.
- ***The Positive impact of this peace agreement was:***
 - that relative peace was realized in Dodoth.
 - Raids progressively reduced and the Turkana did not raid Loyoro Sub County and vice versa for a long time.
- ***This agreement has also met with challenges due to:***
 - poverty and lack of funds follow up on peace processes.
 - There are peace spoilers who interfere with the peace process and they are often strong members of the communities.
 - The occasional internal raids by Jie raiders have also created loss of confidence in peace talks.
 - Due to poor road network, tracking of raiders and maintaining security in the area is a challenge.

3.4.22. NAKAPELIMORU PEACE AGREEMENT OF 1980's

- This was held during to the rampant raids at the time.
- It was decreed that there should be lasting peace between the Turkana and Jie for 100yrs.

- This agreement was held when Chief Koryang Timothy Lokayana was still in power and was a witness to this peace agreement.
- It was agreed that those who breach should be pursued and apprehended.
- A resolution was also passed that if a rider kills someone, that person has to be compensated by the killer or members of his family.

3.4.23. LOLELIA DECLARATION OF 1983/4

- ***In this peace declaration, it was agreed that:***
 - all Turkana livestock be recovered and handed back to Turkana and
 - the culprits involved in the said raids be apprehended.
 - The UNLA militia indiscriminate operations and activities separated the Jie and Turkana.
 - All groups who had settled at Lolelia got scattered and this caused another conflict.
 - The Turkana raided kraals at Kalomide and the fight took place at Nabani
- ***The positive results of this declaration were that:***
 - the recovery of stolen animals and handing back became an on-going exercise though not effectively.
 - The Turkana and Jie are freely interacting to-date.
 - Both communities are following up on their stolen animals peacefully – instead of counter raiding and undertaking reprisals.
 - The Jie and Turkana are united and think of themselves as brothers.
- ***Those issues that were not resolved were:***
 - rampant cattle raids,
 - poor road network in the region,
 - poor government policies on the region,
 - apprehended culprits are usually set free for lack of evidence.
 - On-going military operation has hindered joint grazing.
 - The recovery of stolen animals is not effective.
 - Joint markets have not been established;
 - adequate water and health services are not provided.
 - Actual raiders who were involved are resisting demands for compensation for lives lost during their raids and the animals stolen. This is because

communities themselves are not honouring the agreements as stipulated on compensation.

- There is still prevalence of small arms in the region.
- Peace spoilers continue to breach the agreements.
- Ineffective and inefficient law enforcement system in the region.
- Government strict policies on border issues limit interaction and trade between the communities.
- Compromise by law enforcers regarding the culprits of raids.

3.4.24. KACHERI WOMEN PEACE MEETING 2003

- This peace meeting was held in Kacheri, Kotido and the Turkana women delegation was led by Dr. Akabwae of *Cape Unit of OAU IBAR*.
- The most important things that communities recall of this peace meeting is that ***there remained many unresolved issues including that:***
 - forceful military disarmament has not managed to get rid of all the guns.
 - The road network is still poor.
 - Kraals have not been merged for common grazing and there is fear of disease outbreaks if kraals merge.
 - Apprehending culprits, raiders are hampered by cover-up by their kinsmen and friends.
 - The water pans have not been excavated.
 - There is always the challenge of porous borders and risk of entry for more guns once disarmament has taken place.
 - There is lack of both financial and technical resources to advance the peace process.
 - The communities are not committed to peace agreements.
 - There is the challenge of belittling of women in the peace process and male dominance in the meetings.
 - Communities are not transparent and often conceal the identities of those involved in raids

3.4.25. THE KANANGOROK PEACE AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 2008 (DODOTH AND SUDAN)

- This peace meeting discussed and agreed on the following issues:
 - review of the peace agreement with Dodoth and disarmament of Dodoth.
 - 274 guns were burnt in front of the gathering as a sign of an everlasting peace.
 - A new route was opened and named Laura Ayaa who was killed by Toposa warriors. She was a peace Mediator between Dodoth and Didinga of Sudan.
 - Trade between the two communities was agreed upon and cessation of cattle raiding was also agreed upon.
 - The construction of a road connecting Uganda and Sudan was agreed upon and the Minister for Education promised to build school in the memory of the late Laura Ayaa as a peace connector to bring the two communities together ie Didinga in Sudan and the Dodoth in Uganda.
 - It was also agreed at this peace meeting that armed civilians in both countries be disarmed.
- *What followed was evidence of free movement of people between the two countries.*
 - Free market and auction were established.
 - Market days were set and were said to be a continuous venture.
 - There was the creation of joint schools and free movement.
 - Under cash for work community schemes were implemented, the people were also able to get opportunities to share experiences.

3.4.26. THE KAPOETA PEACE AGREEMENT OF 18TH MAY 2008 (TOPOSA AND DODOTH)

- Under this peace agreement, the issues discussed and agreed up on included:
 - free cross-border movement,
 - An end to killings,
 - stopping of cattle raiding and
 - disarmament of all pastoralists' communities.

3.4.27. THE DIDINGA - DODOTH PEACE AGREEMENT OF 1993

- This agreement was between the Dodoth of Uganda and the Didinga of Sudan. It was an initiative of the two communities themselves.
- The Didinga sent representatives to the Dodoth and negotiations started till they reached an agreement that the peace meetings must be held.
- In the peace meeting, the following were agreed upon:
 - free movement between the communities,
 - A road would be constructed from Kaabong to Lotukei,
 - there would be trade between the communities and an auction Market would take place twice in a month,
 - Abolition of black-market type of trade- abolition of the sale of guns and bullets.
- This agreement lasted for 15 years and it was meant to solve the issues to do with cattle raiding and also enhanced trade during this period.
- ***However, inspite of some positive outcomes and 15 years of relative peace between the two communities, the following issues remained and challenges were evident:***
 - The social infrastructure that was foreseen to be constructed including roads, schools and education facilities were not done due to lack of funds.
 - Insecurity and killing of persons continued.
 - The communication-radios that would have enhanced communication to security agents and between the community members were unavailable.
 - There is poor road infrastructure in the area that makes it impossible to respond to conflict related incidents in a timely manner.
 - Some community members rejected the agreement and proved hard to convince.
 - This agreement came about as a community initiative and therefore there was limited government involvement and could therefore not be enforced.
 - It took a long time to convince the Dodoth of Uganda to embrace the agreement provisions.

3.4.28. ROMOLA PEACE AGREEMENT

- This was a cross border peace dialogue between the Logiir of Romola and the Didinga.
- This agreement was short lived and ended when the Logir raided the cattle of Didinga to revenge for his cattle that had been raided by the Didinga.
- This cross-border peace dialogue was organized by Kidepo Valley Peace Project Development (KCPPD) a community-based organization.
- It was agreed that:
 - all armed nomadic pastoralists settle in the proposed peace centres to guard the communities living there.
 - disarmament was to be implemented within the communities who are cattle raiders.
 - markets, schools and health centres were to be built within the peace centres.
 - Agriculture was to be undertaken in the peace centres.
 - Police stations were to be established at the peace centres.
- ***The immediate Positive results of this peace initiative*** were that:
 - trade and some other economic activities and social activities like dancing together etc were enhanced.
 - Peace centres within the Kidepo valley were established.
 - A peace committee, markets, schools, and radio communication centres were formed.
 - These peace centres were established at Kamulac, Kidepo, Ramula, Hajiakar, Maji, Lauro, and Longeleya being proposed by the Pact-Sudan.
 - Ease of access to locally produced goods that the communities previously did not have came through these centres from the neighboring countries.
 - This agreement resolved so many issues like unnecessary killings, cattle raiding and insecurity.
 - but there are also some of the issues which remained unresolved until now.
- ***The challenges to this peace agreement as well as unresolved issues include:***
 - the proposed centres collapsed due to lack of funds.
 - Many communities tended to refuse the call for peace because even after the peace dialogues, cattle raids did occur thereafter.

- Funds for building the roads from Kaabong-Kanangorok-Lotukei-Himan-Hakurotom (new site)-Narus-Boma road are yet to be acquired.
- Communication systems have not been purchased and therefore these communities remain isolated.
- There is still a problem of lack of security of person and property and there are also no vehicles for peace monitoring work.

3.4.29 THE PEACE DIALOGUE AT OROPOI-TURKANA KENYA IN 2005

- The participants of this peace dialogue were CSOs (LOKADO, DADO, KOPEIN, RIHWIRIUM Kenya), Religious leaders of Kenya and Uganda, Ngikarachuna, Elders and women of both Kenya (Turkana) and Uganda (Dodoth)
- Issues discussed at this meeting were:
 - Peace and reconciliation between the Dodoth and the Turkana,
 - the arrest of thieves and return of stolen animals,
 - disarmament on both sides and
 - opening of feed roads.
- ***The positive results form this peace agreement was that:***
 - *the Ugandan side is disarming and returning cows but the Turkana are still armed.*
 - *The link road was opened.*
 - *The recovery of stolen animals was effected by UPDF to their counterparts and*
 - *The guns are still being returned by Dodoth.*
- ***The Challenges and unresolved issues are:***
 - Dams have not been excavated or constructed, water provided is inadequate,
 - Peace is still elusive,
 - disarmament on the side of Turkana not yet done, there is still insecurity from raids.
 - Drought has created a situation of looming famine that is a disincentive to peace and small arms trading control.
 - The prevalence of illegal guns makes it difficult to provide effective peace and security.

- Apart from the commitments of the Government of Uganda to its disarmament process, the Governments of Sudan and Kenya have not yet embarked on disarmament.
- With regard to civilian peace actors, peace committees are not motivated.
- Therefore, Peace review meetings take so long to be summoned and are reactionary in nature.
- The long distances to peace meetings especially for the Peace committee members without vehicles or bicycles is another obstacle to full civilian mobilization for peace.

3.4.30. PEACE MEETING AT KIDEPO GAME PARK, FEBRUARY 2008 – UGANDA

- ***This was a high-level peace meeting attended by*** 4 state ministers of Uganda and the Deputy speaker and honourable ministers of Sudan.
- **The issues discussed at this meeting were:**
 - official opening up of border of Uganda and Sudan,
 - commemoration of 15 years of peace between Dodoth and Didinga tribe of Sudan.
 - The meeting was also to promote free trade at the Sudan-Uganda border.
 - In addition, other discussion points were the stopping of small arms trafficking,
 - establishment of central places for markets at common places along the border,
 - encouraging tourism industry at Kidepo valley,
 - promoting education and capacity building in peace and the importance of holding meetings regularly.
- ***The Positive impact of this high-level peace meeting was:***
 - *a reduction in small arms trafficking along the Uganda-Sudan border.*
 - *There came a practice of exchange of students in schools in both countries*
 - *as well as recovery of stolen animals.*
 - The handover of stolen cattle was done only in Uganda but not in Kenya.
- ***However, the following issues remained unresolved and challenged the peace agreement:***
 - the opening of markets did not take immediate effect due to insecurity to traders.

- The opening up of roads from Kalapata – Oropoi roads required heavy duty grading for it to last the seasons.
- Cattle raiders were not easily apprehended and those who were caught were not prosecuted as was agreed at the peace agreement.
- The lack of commitments by governments was evident as both Kenya and Sudan have not disarmed armed nomadic pastoralists.
- In Uganda also, the non uniform disarmament process created vulnerability to those communities who had voluntarily handed in their guns.
- The proliferation of small arms in the region again gained momentum since the enforcement of the provisions of the agreement was not forthcoming.
- The branding of animals was only undertaken in Uganda and Sudan but Kenya did not brand their animals.
- The local communities were seen as not being committed to peace as there was lack of political will to continue civic engagement towards peace.
- Poor communication on security incidences and corruption in reported cases of animals stolen created multiple challenges to recovery of livestock.
- According to the laws of Uganda, cattle rusting are a criminal offence that deserves capital punishment but this law is not implemented and criminals are not prosecuted upon surrender of arms.

C. FROM THE TRI-POINT OF UGANDA-SOUTH SUDAN AND KENYA AND TRI-POINT OF KENYA-ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH SUDAN.

3.4.31. NADAPAL PEACE AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER – DECEMBER 2007

- This was an agreement between the Toposa and Turkana.
- They agreed that stolen livestock must be recovered and returned.
- The cattle must be the same ones that were stolen and not exchanged.
- ***The result of these peace agreements was that:***
 - Out of the 48 cattle stolen by the Toposa only 12 were recovered. This failed the agreement because since then the Toposa have never returned any more cattle.
 - The Turkana are also not happy with the outcome of the agreement.
 - There has been increase in banditry in the recent days due to that case of the violations of the agreement.
- ***The challenges to the peace agreements were:***
 - that there was a lot of suspicion and lack of trust between Toposa and Turkana communities after the Toposa failed to return the cattle as they had agreed.
 - Therefore, the agreement as per now failed and was never resolved.
 - As a result, more theft and killings have increased.
 - In addition, the lack of financial resources for further dialogue blocked any further discussions between the two communities.
 - Disease of livestock and livestock losses often demanded for replenishing of lost stock through raids.
 - Moreover, there are no security personnel at the border.
 - Border and internal infrastructure are poor and there was no response from agencies and governments over the matter.

3.4.32. LOKICHOGGIO PEACE MEETINGS 1992, 2005, 2006

- ***In these peace agreements the following issues were agreed upon:***
 - The Turkana community youths were asked to avoid raiding neighbours' including the Dodoth of Uganda, Toposa of Sudan.

- In addition, the raided animals from affected community must be returned back. A case is cited whereby 10 calves were returned to the Turkana community in 2006. These calves belonged to a man called Kalimapus.
- It was also agreed that there should be sharing of pastures and water across the border.
- This was seen as a peace connector between the nomadic pastoralist groups. Another provision was that whenever any person crosses the border, he or she should not kill any animal or steal any livestock.
- ***The Positive results of these agreements were that:***
 - there was a long-lasting peace.
 - The two communities shared pastures and water.
 - The livestock from both sides increased in numbers.
 - The two communities intermarried.
 - There was barter trade between the two communities.
 - The two communities developed mutual friendship.
 - People were happy with APDI since it was the CBO, which brought peace.
- ***The challenges faced by these agreements were that:***
 - whenever the Turkana return back the raided animals, the Toposa people are not willing to return back the animals.
 - The youth from both communities are rebellious and refused to heed to the call of their elders for peace.

3.4.33. THE NADAPAL PEACE AGREEMENT OF 2006

- This peace deal was brokered by APEDI at Nadapal in 2006.
- The two communities accepted to bring their youths together and advise them accordingly
- ***Issues agreed during this agreement included that:***
 - peace should prevail since a lot of lives and loss of animals have been experienced in the two communities.
 - The youth who are fond of raiding should be punished.
 - The raided animals should be returned back and
 - a fine has to be imposed on the raider.
 - The two communities agreed to share pastures and water across the border.

- The two communities share water at Logier Akope across the border.
- ***After this peace agreement was effected,***
 - all animals shared pastures in the same region at Nadapal.
 - There was barter trade between two communities.
 - The two communities thus Toposa community and Turkana community agreed to encourage inter-mariages.
 - The animals in these two communities increased in numbers. Human lives were respected. There was no rampant death experienced during that time.
- ***The challenges faced in the implementation of the agreement were:***
 - There are a lot of small arms infiltrating the border of Kenya and Sudan.
 - If disarmament is launched between these communities, then there will be long lasting peace.
 - The Toposa people are perceived as opposed to peace. They are seen as the ones who always initiate attacks to the Turkana community.
 - The youths between these communities did not seem to listen to their elders.
 - They continued attacking each other.

3.4.34. NADAPAL PEACE AGREEMENTS (MARCH, AUGUST, NOVEMBER 2007)

- The agreement of March 2008 saw to the willingness of the Turkana to take back the stolen animals to Toposa region at Nadapal.
- During this time the ***major issues that arose from these meetings were:***
 - The SPLA army pulled out of Kibes.
 - The two communities agreed to share pastures and water across the border.
 - The children that Toposa people stole from Turkana community were returned back to their rightful owners.
 - The two community members paid a visit to each across the boarder.
 - Barter trade between these communities was improved.
 - People also were able to get animals from Toposa people as gifts.
 - There was sustainable peace.
 - The Kenya government are able to claim Nadapal and also people will move freely from Kenya to Sudan without fear or any **attack**.

- The two communities are pastoralists in nature. In case one-community experiences a cute drought and animals get finished, then the members of that community launch a raid to increase their stock.
- When people are attending peace meetings, the Toposa people launch an attack to the Turkana community. An example is the death of Lopua in 2004.
- The leadership of Kapweta East County are not committed to peace process inspite of signing peace processes documents at Nadapal (March 2008). This leadership continues inciting the Toposa people to attack the Turkana people.

3.4.35. THE NADAPAL PEACE AGREEMENT OF APRIL 2007,

- The Turkana and Toposa met in Nadapal.
- Both Turkana and Toposa agreed that they should stop conflict.
- They also slaughtered a white bull showing a sign of peace.
- ***In this meeting the problems of the communities were stated as:***
 - the lack of transport to reach to places where the problem used to occur e.g places like Kachelakeny which is bordering Kenya,
 - lack of telecommunication equipment so that when any insecurity incident occurs, or livestock properties are stolen, people can be able to ring to the government Commissioner of the other side of the border.
- ***The following were discussed at both the 2006 and 2007 meetings:***
- At Nadapal, Nakukoit and Solia in the 2006 the following were said:
 - The two communities were told to share pastures and water across the border.
 - The raided animals are supposed to be returned back to the affected community.
 - The two community members were advised to practice barter trade. This was said in.
 - A fine is supposed to be imposed on any raider. This will help to discourage youth from raiding their neighbours among the two communities.
 - This peace process that was brokered by APEDI in 2006 really lasted for so long.
 - The parents were told to advice their children to stay away from raiding.
 - And that the culprits will be handed over to the police in Kenya or Sudan.
 - The raided animals must be returned back to the affected community.

- A fine was imposed to the raided animals. In case 50 cattle are raided, and then 50 cattle will be added on top of the 50 raided cattle.
- Peace must be preached to every village that is found between these two communities.
- ***The impact of the Nadapal peace process was that:***
 - the animals in these two communities increased.
 - The community members from one community were able to visit another community.
 - The Toposa people visited different parts of Turkana.
 - There was barter trade between these two communities.
 - The two communities inter-married with one another.
 - The Turkana community women were able to exploit the resources from the forests on the Toposa side without any fear of any attack.
- ***Challenge and the unresolved issues regarding this peace agreement were:***
 - in a midst of peace era, the Toposa people attacked the Turkana community. The Toposa youth attacked the camels of Lonyaman and 8 people were killed and 36 camels were driven away.
 - This happened on March 2007 at Kaloyaramuge.
 - The raided animals were not returned back.
 - The raided camels were not brought back.
 - Rampant stealing of animals continues.
 - There was highway robbery along Lokichoggio and Nadapal road.
 - The Toposa people really continued to launch attacks on the Turkana people.
 - The youths from the two communities continued stealing cattle from each of the two sides

3.4.36. SOLIA HILLS PEACE AGREEMENTS 2006/7

- ***In this agreement, the members of the two communities agreed to:***
 - share pastures and water.
 - do barter trade.
- The result was that there was improved relationship between the Toposa and Turkana.

3.4.37. THE NARUS INTERCOMMUNITY PEACE AGREEMENT 2007

- ***The results of this peace agreement were:***
 - return of 10-raided cattle to Turkana and the Turkana also returned 10 calves to Toposa.
 - The returning of raided animals was done in Nadapal in the presence of the two (2) District commissioners (KENYA/SUDAN) and the two (2) coordinators for APEDI/KENDA
- ***The challenges to the peace process under this agreement were:***
 - the implemented proportion of agreement as planned is less than 50% due to:
 - lack of transport,
 - lack of funding,
 - lack of peace workers and
 - lack of communication equipment.

3.4.38. NARUS PROVISIONAL PEACE AGREEMENT 2007

- The peace agreement was the preparation for a bigger agreement which was attended by senior government officials from both sides known as ***Provisional Peace Agreement***.
- It was between the Turkana and the Toposa.
- It was agreed that between the two communities there was to be:
 - compensation for loss of lives,
 - return of stolen (raided) cattle,
 - sharing of grass/water along the burden,
 - stopping cattle theft.
- ***The challenges to this provincial agreement included the:***
 - transport, poor road network,
 - lack of communication equipment,
 - misunderstanding because Turkana used to bring their cattle to graze in Nadapal and the Toposa also take their cattle to Korduluma (another bordering small river).

- There was no action plan developed because the agreements failed.
- It was spoiled by the Turkana which attacked the Toposa immediately after the agreement.
- There was no transport - no vehicles for peace Mobilization, no funding, no communication equipment and no support from authority e.g. Commissioners office and no support from CBO (KENYA).
- No significant achievements were made in this peace process because the Turkana spoiled it when they attacked the cattle Kraals (camps) around the foot of Mt. Losalia and Kachallakiemy in Kabekenyang and Natinga areas.
- Although the details of the peace agreements could not be established in the time towards this Regional Meeting of IC- GLR in 2009, members state officials and community leaders, said that there is need to make mention of the following peace agreements as well:
 - Nakutoit Peace Accord 2006,
 - Kibish Meetings of Ethiopia,
 - Lokitau Peace Meetings – North Kenya,
 - Pume Police Station Meeting of Ethiopia,
 - Lodwar Women Peace Meeting 2004 and
 - Kotido Youth Peace Meeting 2005.

3.4.39. PROVINCIAL PEACE AGREEMENT (PPA) IN SOUTH OMO 2006

The *South Omo Provincial Peace Agreement* was signed between the Nyangatom of Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya.

- Governments of both countries and civil society organizations participated in the event.
- ***In this provincial peace agreement, there were specific action plans.*** These plans had indicators that would be used as tools to monitor the peace process. Some actions included that were agreed upon were:
 - compensation plan and details for people killed, number of animals stolen and follow-up methods on this,
 - construction of joint schools at the border and
 - construction of access roads to insecure areas of the region as well as

- deployment of security at the border due to evident inability of provincial administration to effect border patrols.
- *the challenges faced rregarding this peace agreement, include:*
 - the fact that peace actors are discouraged to follow up the peace agreements due to lack of financial assistance.
 - A lot agreed upon has remained unresolved and not implemented.
 - Monitoring of the implementation of the peace agreement is not as effective as envisaged.
 - There is also weak continued committed support by the regional governments at cross border level.
 - The government assists and participates in the peace dialogue but is not keen to follow up the implementation of the provisions of the peace agreements.
 - Each government is keen to ensure law and order is followed on their own side of the border and the action on collaboration is not strong to-date although there is rhetoric to that effect.

A copy of the Provincial Peace Agreement signed in South Omo in 2006 giving details of the agreement can be got from Riam Riam, Moroto

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. For durable peace and development to be achieved among the ‘Ateker’ communities occupying the IC-GLR Zone 3, a more strategic long-term approach to sustainable peace and security is required. This approach should:
 - a. integrate security, establishment of cross-border civil administration, enforcement of law and order and inclusion of civilians in security and peace matters as key stakeholders.
2. The provision of tangible development actions should also be considered in areas of:
 - a. Socialservice provision of schools and hospitals etc
 - b. Alternative and diversified economic livelihood opportunities and
 - c. the creation of shared co-existence opportunities and infrastructures such as secure trade routes, common water points, animal health and marketing facilities will promote co-existence between conflict communities across the ‘Ateker’ in the IC-GLR Zone 3 border areas.

3. Communities have a clear vision of what kind of specific peace connectors that are required in their communities. Therefore, member states with the support of AU, ICGLR, IGAD, EAC secretariat and respective Development partners should support communities implement these peace connectors.
4. The role of IC- GLR/IGAD/EAC member states should be seen to be a mandate role of duty bearers and this legal mandate of states should lead civil administrations and community leaders in the right direction of establishing safe, orderly and more disciplined grazing and movements across their international borders.
5. Social accountability and responsibilities of the different stakeholders should be mapped out and a code of conduct be discussed and agreed and to be followed by livestock herders and other respective stakeholders on each transhumance or grazing routes.
6. Joint fusion units (consisting of security agencies, administrators, and law enforcement agencies) of collaborating member states should be constituted to undertake joint investigations, joint verifications, coordination, documentation, monitoring and liaison with respective mandated agencies in host country.
7. The effectiveness of Member States in provision of security and inclusion of civilian police and communities in security and peacebuilding will be critical in ensuring long term peace in the 'Ateker' (ICGLR Zone 3).
8. Inclusion of communities by integrating their informal and formal leadership structures in decision making and accountability mechanisms for tracking of the offenders and recovery and return of stolen livestock etc, cures the problems of marginalization and exclusion that has spanned decades. This will ensure the promotion of citizen accountability as opposed to criminality, lawlessness and impunity that has characterized many pastoralists (citizen) behaviours among cross-border 'Ateker' communities in ICGLR Zone 3.
9. The following diagram presents detail of actions for the attainment of sustainable peace and security that need to be implemented in an integrated, coordinated manner by Member States of Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia and their Development Partners where armed pastoralists live across borders in the ICGLR Zone 3.



In conclusion,

- The IC-GLR Pact, IGAD protocols on cross border nomadic pastoralism, EAC protocols and Bilateral MoUs and Resources sharing agreements and joint projects on Zone 3 such as disarmament of armed pastoralists are great opportunities for Member States, Development Partners and Ateker cross-border Communities to start a more collaborative and participatory government - citizens' driven processes towards lasting peace, security, rule of law and economic transformation.
- The actual implementation of identified IC-GLR/EAC/IGAD member states projects of joint border management, joint disarmament, service provision, and promotion of trade and local economic development in the 'Ateker' border communities of IC-GLR Zone 3, will positively alter the negative nexus of under development And contribute to socio-economic transformation and prosperity.
- Such systematic, coordinated and integrated development long term commitment will within a few decades, lift the cross-border 'Ateker' communities to the same

level of development as in the rest of the developed communities in their Nation States.